Introduction
In his study of the judgments of the Supreme Court of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope during the second half of the nineteenth century, Reinhard Zimmermann stressed the importance, especially in a common-law procedural environment, of the role of the Bar. He pointed out that " [d] ie 'dogmatischen' Grundlagen des Urteilen hängen zu einem grossen Teil von der Quellenpräsentation durch die Advokaten ab". 1 In this study, the focus shifts to the fi rst half of the nineteenth century. The subject of that focus is the role of advocates during the fi rst two decades (1828-1850) of the existence of the Supreme Court of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, which was established by the First Charter of Justice of 1827.
Under the provisions of the Charter, the advocates and judges operated within an environment in which a common-law judicial and procedural framework was imposed upon the Roman-Dutch law that had been brought to the Cape by the Dutch settlers and confi rmed by the Charter as part of the law of the Colony. The continued survival (to this day) of the Roman-Dutch law in that environment has on occasion been described as "remarkable". 2 It is customary to pay tribute to the efforts made by the judges (and in particular Menzies J 3 ) during this early period to strengthen and build upon the foundations of Roman-Dutch law. Typical examples of such tributes are the following:
In certain areas it is possible to observe that the court continued to favour Roman-Dutch law strongly, but after Burton J's departure from the Cape real expertise lay with Menzies J and to a lesser extent with Wylde CJ and Kekewich J. Thus in provisional sentence cases the court almost without exception referred to Roman-Dutch sources … 4
There was always one judge to keep the lamp of Roman-Dutch learning alight. Shortly after the departure of Menzies came the native sons Cloete (1855-66) who had been a pupil of Van der Keessel, and the brilliant Watermeyer (1857-67), whose life, alas, was cut off in its fl ower. The future of Roman-Dutch law was assured. 5 Ian Farlam has pointed out that while such tributes are justifi ed, credit should be given to the advocates, learned and steeped in Roman-Dutch law, who were an important determinant of the character of the newly created Court. During these early years, the advocates gave the judges considerable assistance in their efforts to assure the future of Roman-Dutch law. 6 A study of the professional activity of the advocates 7 at the Cape during the early nineteenth century not only reveals their important role in the application 1846 -1910 (Durban, 1986 ) emphasises (at 21) that an "important determinant of the administration of justice in Natal was the character of the Bar". The nineteenth century was not the fi rst during which advocates had a vital role in the development of Roman-Dutch law. In his study of early Roman-Dutch law, JE Scholtens points out that as to its essential features, the Roman-Dutch law was in existence before the publication in 1631 of De Groot's Inleidinge, and that "it was the product of the labours of the advocates of the courts of Holland" ("Early Roman-Dutch law" (1959) Acta Juridica 74-83 at 83). 7
Though throughout the nineteenth century, most of the advocates at the Cape played a prominent part in public life, (CJ Brand, for example, was the fi rst Speaker of the Cape Legislative Assembly;
and development of the law. It also compels reconsideration of certain current assumptions.
2
Advocates at the Cape before 1827 8
There are but few references in the early records of advocates practising at the Cape during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 9 In 1688, the Governor and Raad van Justitie admitted Jacob van Heurn to practise as an advocate and notary in all the courts at Cape Town and in the Court of Landdrost and Heemraden at Stellenbosch. The civil records of the latter court show that he frequently exercised this right. 10 In 1706, the name of Willem ten Damme appears as practising as an advocate. 11 No professional qualifi cation was required for admission as an attorney; it may be that, as in the Netherlands, an advocate had to be a doctor of laws. 12 During the First British Occupation (1795-1803) changes were made to the administration of justice, 13 but the position of legal practitioners was left unchanged.
In 1803, on the retrocession of the Cape to the Batavian Republic, Commissioner-General De Mist found that the administration of justice had fallen into a "sorry state" and proceeded to make wholesale reforms. 14 The admission of legal practitioners was regulated: those seeking admission as attorneys had to pass an examination set by the court's commissioners, while advocates were expressly required to be graduates in law of a Dutch university. 15 many advocates were elected to the Legislative Assembly and through the years their members regularly served as Attorney-General (Minister of Justice) and several as Prime Minister), the focus of this article is on their professional activity as practising lawyers in the fi rst half of the nineteenth century. The advocates also played a vital role in the collection, editing and publication of the early law reports -see JP van Niekerk "An introduction to South African law reports and reporters, 1828 to 1910" (2013) 19(1) Fundamina 106-145. 8 On legal practitioners at the Cape during this period, see C Graham Botha "Early legal practitioners of the The Second British Occupation (1806) heralded a period of gradual and intermittent change in the administration of justice at the Cape, which culminated twenty years later in the fundamental changes introduced by the First Charter of Justice in 1827. 16 During the period 1806 to 1827 the position of legal practitioners remained unaffected.
Advocates who practised at Cape Town 17 prior to the promulgation of the First Charter of Justice in 1827 included Johannes Henoch Neethling, who later became a Judge of the old Court of Justice; 18 Hendrik Cloete, who commenced practice at the Cape in 1816; 19 However, the Charter of Justice also made provision for the admission of those who had practised as advocates in the former Court of Justice 31 -who from 1803 had to have graduated in law in Holland. 32 At the fi rst sitting of the newly established Supreme Court of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, nine advocates were admitted under the new regime introduced by the Charter of Justice of 1827. 33 Seven of them had been advocates of the former Court of Justice; namely, JH Neethling, H Cloete, HR van Rijneveld, J Joubert, CJ Brand, J de Wet and JH Hofmeyr. Also admitted were D Denijssen, 34 the former Fiscal whose offi ce had been replaced by that of the Attorney-General (the fi rst incumbent being Anthony Oliphant 35 ) and Saxe Bannister, the fi rst English-born advocate to be a member of the Cape Bar. Bannister practised at the Cape Bar for only a brief period, until July 1829. Subsequently, on 28 February 1828 and 27 March 1828 respectively, two other advocates of the old court, OM Bergh and A Faure, 36 were also admitted. The next three advocates to be admitted were also colonial born: JG Stadler (admitted 31 Dec 1832), FL Stol (admitted 28 Feb 1833), and W Hidding (admitted 12 Jul 1833). 37 This means that with the exception of the Attorney-General and Saxe Bannister, all persons admitted as advocates of the Cape Supreme Court 31 Section 18 of the Charter of Justice provides: "And we further authorise and empower the said Supreme Court to admit any persons to practise as barristers or advocates therein, who previously to the promulgation of these presents within the said Colony, have been admitted to practise as advocates in the Supreme Court of Justice heretofore existing within the same." Neither Fagan (n 30) nor Hahlo & Kahn (n 5) nor Van den Bergh (n 2) nor Cowen (n 17) make mention of the fact that the Charter made provision for the admission of those who had practised in the former Court of Justice. 32 See n 15 above. It was only in 1858 that Acts 4 and 12 of 1858 (Cape), which set up a Board of Public Examiners, made provision for the admission of advocates who had qualifi ed in South Africa; see, further, Cowen (n 17) at 7-11. 33 Farlam (n 6) at 37-39; and see Botha (n 3) at 391. in the fi rst ten years of its existence were colonial born. The advocates whose names appear in the Menzies' Reports 38 as having been actively involved in litigation in the Cape Supreme Court were all graduates of Dutch universities and former advocates of the old Court of Justice, the one exception being the Attorney-General. The idea that the "fair number of colonists who obtained degrees from distinguished universities in the Netherlands" was a phenomenon of the late nineteenth century only 39 is therefore not borne out by the facts. On 30 December 1836, William Musgrave became the second English-born advocate 40 to be admitted at the Cape. 41 Musgrave soon acquired a reputation as an able lawyer and established a sound practice. Seven years later, in 1843, he was elevated to the Bench upon the retirement of Kekewich J. 42 On 12 July 1837, Petrus Johannes Denijssen was admitted. He was the son of D Denijssen, the former Fiscal who had been one of those admitted in 1827. PJ Denijssen obtained an LLD from Leiden University, subsequently entered the Inner Temple and was called to the Bar in London on 18 November 1836. He was elevated to the Bench in 1868 and remained a Judge of the Cape Supreme Court until 1877. 43 On 31 May 1839 followed the admission of JF and JH Dreyer. 44 On 26 November 1839, JW Ebden was admitted. He was born at the Cape, was a graduate of Cambridge, and on 28 May 1835 was called to the Bar by the Middle Temple. Oliphant retired as Attorney-General in March 1839, to be succeeded briefl y by 38 On the Menzies' Reports, see n 48 below. 39 As Van den Bergh (n 2) at 86 seems to suggest when she refers, by way of example, to Judges Juta, Kotzé, the De Villiers brothers, Wessels, Steyn and Hertzog. 40 Saxe Bannister was the fi rst, but he practised at the Cape Bar for but a few months. 41 The admission of Musgrave gave rise to an extraordinary attack on the Cape Bar in an editorial published in the issue of 31 Jan 1837 of The Moderator, a local newspaper. Three causes were identifi ed "which justify our predilections in favour of English Barristers. The fi rst is, the character and manner of their education; secondly, the class of person who betake themselves to the profession; and thirdly, the manner in which the legal business is conducted." De Zuid-Afrikaan, with a number of advocates (including CJ Brand, JH Neethling and J de Wet) on its editorial board, sprang to the defence of the Cape Bar in an article reprinted in an English translation in the 28 Feb 1837 issue of The Moderator. As Farlam points out (n 6), the writer had no diffi culty in demolishing the three "causes" for preferring English barristers: the advocates were all doctors of law from leading universities in Holland; they came from the leading families in the Colony, and the Supreme Court had been functioning for ten years in a vastly superior manner to that of the old Court of Justice. from Arntzenius to Zutphen! 54 The links of the advocates with the preceding regime are refl ected in the occasional citation as authority, especially in the early years, of decisions of the former Court of Justice. 55 It should be kept in mind that prior to 1828 these advocates practised within a judicial regime in which Roman-Dutch law was still a living system of law within Holland.
The contention that the advocates who practised at the Cape in the early nineteenth century had limited knowledge of the Roman-Dutch sources cannot be sustained. 56 They were all law graduates of Dutch universities, and outstanding amongst them were CJ Brand and Hendrik Cloete. Cloete spent ten years in practice before the Court of Justice (1816-1827) and almost twenty years (1828-1846) in practice at the Cape Bar. As a Judge, Cloete was highly regarded for his comprehensive knowledge of the Roman-Dutch authorities, 57 and his erudite application of Roman-Dutch law played an important role in keeping it alive in Natal. 58 His sterling work as advocate during the fi rst two decades of the Cape Supreme Court has gone unheralded.
The superimposition of a common-law judicial and procedural framework upon the Roman-Dutch law profoundly infl uenced the manner of practice at the Cape. On questions of substantive law, the advocates referred extensively to writers on Roman-Dutch law. On questions of practice and procedure, they referred to English works. In Rogerson v Meyer & Berning 59 counsel and the Court referred to texts from Justinian's Code, numerous passages from Voet, Leeuwen's Censura forensis, Van der Linden's Koopman's handboek and Pothier's Traité des obligations. In the same case, on questions of procedure, reference was made to Harrison's Digest, Tidd on Practice, Chitty on Pleading, Archbold on Pleading, Maddox on Chancery Practice, and Stephen on Pleading. All these works deal with common-law practice prior to the abolition of the forms of action. No wonder that traces of the forms of action are found in nineteenth-century South African cases. 60 The picture would not be complete without mention of the fact that in certain areas of the law, the advocates did not hesitate to cite English authority. 61 
4
The
case of Letterstedt v Morgan
In 1849 at the end of the period under review, in Letterstedt v Morgan and Others 64 Wylde CJ made a statement that on the face of it seems to gainsay the views expressed thus far. The statement has given rise to the view that the "Roman-Dutch authorities held but a tenuous position in the early years of the Supreme Court," 65 and that Wylde "was no great defender of Roman-Dutch law" 66 and had little regard for the authorities cited by counsel. The statement reads as follows:
Quote what Dutch or Roman books you please -musty or otherwise 67 -and they must be musty if they lay down such doctrines. I belong to a higher Court than they refer to - One should not lose sight of the fact that the issue before the Court was a narrow one: The recusal of the judges. 71 Referring to a host of civil-law authority, 72 counsel for the defendants contended that the judges could not participate in the question of we are told that we are not bound to decide simply upon the Ordinances, but according to the laws in force, and there is no doubt that the Dutch law is in force in this Colony, except in so far as it has been abrogated by subsequent enactments." their own recusation -judges when challenged should at once retire. 73 The further contention was that if recusal of the whole court and not an individual judge was sought, the issue of recusal must be decided by a superior court or the sovereign. 74 It was especially this latter contention that aroused the ire of Wylde CJ and led to his extraordinary outburst; for, if the judges were to be recused, the Court would be left in limbo without a quorum. Hence his statement that his Court could not be "broken up or paralysed" by such authority, and that he could not be bound by the practice (my emphasis) of the Dutch courts. Indeed, he stated that the Dutch practice as described by Voet could not be applied to the situation at the Cape: 75
When we look at Voet, we fi nd that there was a court of seven, of fi ve, and so on. Can we look at their practice to regulate our procedure in such courts as this?
Menzies J in his judgement considered the civil law authorities and stated his conclusion as follows: 76
It is a fi xed rule of law that an exception cannot be taken to the whole Court or to a quorum; and an exception that would have the effect of destroying a legal quorum cannot be pleaded.
On that ground, and on that ground alone, I stated that, notwithstanding what had been brought to my notice, it was my duty to remain.
This conclusion fi nds support in Kersteman's Hollandsch rechtsgeleerd woordenboek 77 in which it is said that the challenging or recusing of a whole court has been abolished, though recusation can still take place against the particular person of a judge. It can hardly be contended, on the strength of Chief Justice Wylde's statement, that the Roman-Dutch authorities "held but a tenuous position in the early years of the Supreme Court". 78 If the position was indeed tenuous, one would not expect counsel to have referred in extenso to civil-law authority (as they had done for the 73 The principle is stated thus by Schultingius in his Dissertatio de recusatione iudicis cap XII §8:
"Hodie si quis ex collegis judicum recusetur, moris est, ut ab aliis ejusdem collegii membris recusandi causa examinetur, ac de ea pronuncietur. Ipse recusatus ut de illa hoc est, de propria causa cognoscat, nulla pacto permittetur." 74 Amongst a host of other authority, Voet 5 1 47 was cited in support of this proposition. Both Wylde CJ and Menzies J refer to this passage in their judgments. 75 At 381. 76 At 388. See, also, at 393 where Menzies J states: "The decision is that with regard to the alleged opinions the exception is wrong in point of fact; secondly, that it has not pleaded the exceptio iudicis suspecti; and thirdly, that although it is possible that some fact might exist, yet it is so vaguely and inartifi cially pleaded that on that ground also the exception is out of Court." 77 2 ed (Amsterdam, 1777) at 406 sv "recusatio". 78 See n 64 above.
preceding twenty years). Moreover, in his judgment, Musgrave J explicitly confi rmed that "there is no doubt that the Dutch law is in force in this Colony". 79 Menzies J in his judgment considered the civil-law authorities and based his decision not to withdraw on their authority. Even Wylde CJ gave different circumstances as reason for not following Voet. After all, at the time of the Letterstedt-case, Wylde CJ had for twenty-two years presided over a court in which Roman and Roman-Dutch authority had from the outset been extensively quoted and followed. Thus in In re Insolvent Estate of Buisinne; Van der Byl and Meyer v Sequestrator and Attorney-General, 80 a case that came before the Cape Supreme Court in the fi rst year of its existence, it is stated that "the Court is of opinion that these authorities [Codex, Pothier, Leeuwen, Voet, Van der Keessel] prove, that, the law of Rome and Holland, and, consequently, of this colony ...". 81 In his judgment in a case decided not long after Letterstedt, in 1851, Wylde CJ was not averse to accepting Roman-Dutch authority when he said that the "action for slander is given in the Roman-Dutch law in case of words uttered dolo malo for the purpose of traducing the character and estimation of another". 82 In Pike v Hamilton, Ross & Co, 83 one of Wylde's last cases before his fi nal illness, counsel on both sides (Watermeyer and Porter AG for the plaintiff, and CJ Brand for the defendant) referred to the Institutes, Pothier and a number of passages from Voet and Grotius. The three judges agreed that the law as set out in the authorities cited by counsel was applicable to the case before them. Wylde, who had lost his notes and gave judgement from memory, simply stated that the position was as set out by Voet, Leeuwen and "all the authorities". 84 In their concurring judgments, Judges Ebden and Bell explicitly based their judgments on the authorities cited by counsel in argument.
Conclusion
The year 1850, when Menzies J died after serving as senior Puisne Judge for twentythree years from 1828 to 1850, marks the end of an era in the early history of the Cape Supreme Court. The fi rst two decades of its existence constitutes perhaps the most important formative period in the history of the Cape Supreme Court. Form and content had 79 to be found for the system created by the Charters of Justice: A system whose main formative element, Roman-Dutch law, had to fi nd application within a judicial and procedural framework of common-law origin. The advocates who practised at the Supreme Court during those years were eminently qualifi ed and experienced to fulfi l that task. Most of them were graduates of Dutch universities and, equally importantly, most of them had practised during the previous regime when the Roman-Dutch law was still a living system in Holland, the then governing colonial power. Moreover, they were also familiar with English law and practice, several of them having been called to the Bar in London or Edinburgh. From the outset, it was these advocates who were a most important determinant factor in shaping the character of the newly created Court. At the Cape during that time there was no confrontation between the proponents of Roman-Dutch law and English law -the bellum juridicum is a twentieth-century phenomenon. Roman-Dutch law continued to be accepted as part of the law of the land in the practice of the Cape Supreme Court throughout the nineteenth century. This acceptance was emphatically confi rmed during the forty years that Lord De Villiers dominated the scene as Chief Justice. As a member of the Privy Council he wanted all cases in which Roman-Dutch law featured to be allocated to him on the ground that the other members of the Privy Council had an inadequate knowledge of Roman-Dutch law. 85 This does not mean that Roman-Dutch law was the only actor on the stage. Not only had ties with its country of origin been severed, but the introduction in Holland of a civil code based on the French Civil Code meant that Roman-Dutch law was no longer a living system. Roman-Dutch law at the Cape then found application within an English-colonial political environment, and the courts operated within a procedural regime of English origin. In the circumstances, because the law needed to keep pace with the rapid economic developments of the second half of the nineteenth century, the courts turned to English law to complement Roman-Dutch law (especially in the fi eld of mercantile law) and legislation was based on English precedents. 86 Whatever tensions there might have been between them at times, these various elements were the building blocks of the new mixed system. 87 And from the very fi rst years of the life of the Cape Supreme Court, the advocates in a pragmatic way set about fashioning a coherent system from these building blocks. They laid the foundations of the system that during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries spread to the rest of Southern Africa, the system that underlay the law of the Union This does not mean that Roman-Dutch law was the only actor on the stage. Ties with Holland had been severed. Roman Dutch-law found application within an English colonial political environment, and the courts operated within a procedural regime of English origin. In the Netherlands, the country of origin of Roman-Dutch law, the introduction of a code based on the French Civil Code meant that Roman-Dutch law was no longer a living system. In the circumstances, developments in the fi eld of mercantile law, in particular, were assimilated with reference to English law and through legislation derived from English precedents. Whatever tensions there might have been at times, these various elements were in fact the building blocks of the new mixed system. From the very fi rst years, the advocates, in a pragmatic way, played their part in fashioning a coherent system from these building blocks.
